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Abstract
We study the problem of approximation of optimal values in partially-observable Markov
decision processes (POMDPs) with long-run average objectives. POMDPs are a standard
model for dynamic systems with probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior in uncertain
environments. In long-run average objectives rewards are associated with every transition of
the POMDP and the payoff is the long-run average of the rewards along the executions of
the POMDP. We establish strategy complexity and computational complexity results. Our
main result shows that finite-memory strategies suffice for approximation of optimal values,
and the related decision problem is recursively enumerable complete.
∗Partially supported by Austrian Science Fund (FWF) NFN Grant No RiSE/SHiNE S11407, by CONICYT-
Chile through grant PII 20150140, and by ECOS-CONICYT through grant C15E03.
†IST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria.
‡Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile.
§CEREMADE, CNRS, Universite´ Paris Dauphine, PSL University, Paris, France.
1 Introduction
In this work we present results related to strategy complexity and computational complexity of
partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) with long-run average objectives.
POMDPs. Markov decision processes (MDPs) [17] are standard models for dynamic systems
with probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior. MDPs provide the appropriate model to solve
problems in sequential decision making such as control of probabilistic systems and probabilis-
tic planning [27], where the nondeterminism represents the choice of actions (of the controller
or planner) while the stochastic response of the system to control actions is represented by
the probabilistic behavior. In perfect-observation (or perfect-information) MDPs, to resolve the
nondeterministic choices among control actions the controller observes the current state of the
system precisely. However, to model uncertainty in system observation the relevant model is par-
tially observable MDPs (POMDPs) where the state space is partitioned according to observations
that the controller can observe, i.e., the controller can only view the observation of the current
state (the partition the state belongs to), but not the precise state [25]. POMDPs are widely
used in several applications, such as in computational biology [12], speech processing [24], image
processing [11], software verification [5], robot planning [21, 19], reinforcement learning [20], to
name a few. Even special cases of POMDPs, namely, probabilistic automata or blind MDPs,
where there is only one observation, is also a standard model in many applications [28, 26, 4].
Infinite-horizon objectives. A transition in a POMDP is the update of the current state to the
next state given a control action, and a play is an infinite sequence of transitions. Transitions are
associated with rewards and an objective function maps plays to real-valued rewards. Classical
infinite-horizon objectives are [15, 27]: (a) the discounted-sum of the rewards of the plays; and
(b) the long-run average of the rewards of the plays. Another related class of infinite-horizon
objectives are ω-regular objectives, that defines an ω-regular set Φ of plays, and the objective
is the characteristic function that assigns reward 1 to plays in Φ and 0 otherwise.
Strategies. A strategy (or policy) is a recipe that describes how to extend finite prefixes of plays,
i.e., given a sequence of past actions and observations, it describes the next action. A strategy is
finite-memory if it only remembers finite amount of information of the prefixes, i.e., formally, a
finite-memory strategy can be described as a transducer with finite state space. A special class
of finite-memory strategies is finite-recall strategies that only remembers the information of last
k-steps, for some finite k.
Values and approximation problems. Given a POMDP, an objective, and a starting state, the
optimal value is the supremum over all strategies of the expected value of the objective.
• The approximation problem given a POMDP, an objective function, a starting state and
ε > 0 asks to compute the optimal value within an additive error of ε.
• The decision version of the approximation problem, given a POMDP, an objective function,
a starting state, a number x and ε > 0, with the promise that the optimal value is either
(a) at least x+ ε or (b) at most x− ε, asks to decide which is the case.
Previous results. The approximation problem for discounted-sum objectives is decidable for
POMDPs (by reduction to finite-horizon objectives whose complexity has been well-studied [25,
2]). However, both for long-run average objectives and ω-regular objectives the approximation
problem is undecidable, even for blind MDPs [22]. Finer characterization have been studied for
probabilistic automata (or blind MDPs) with finite words and ω-regular objectives specified in its
canonical form such as parity or Rabin objectives [1, 16, 6, 7, 9, 14]. It has been established that
even qualitative problems which ask whether there is a strategy that ensures the objective with
positive probability or probability 1 is Σ02-complete for blind MDPs with ω-regular objectives [7]
(i.e., complete for the second level of the arithmetic hierarchy): first the undecidability for
qualitative problems was established in [3] and the precise characterization was established
in [7]. The Σ02-completeness result is quite interesting because typically undecidable problems
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for automata on infinite words tend to be harder and lie in the analytical hierarchy (beyond the
arithmetic hierarchy); for details see [6, 7].
Open questions. There are several open questions related to the approximation problem for
POMDPs with long-run average objectives. The two most important ones are as follows: First,
while for POMDPs with ω-regular objectives there are characterization in the arithmetic hier-
archy, there are no such results for POMDPs with long-run average objectives. Second, given
the importance of POMDPs with long-run average objectives, there are several algorithmic ap-
proaches based on belief state-space discretization 1; however none of these approaches provide
any theoretical guarantee.
Our contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
• Strategy complexity. First, we show that for every blind MDP with long-run average
objectives, for every ε > 0, there is finite-recall strategy that achieves expected reward
within ε of the optimal value. Second, we show that for every POMDP with long-run
average objectives, for every ε > 0, there is a finite-memory strategy that achieves expected
reward within ε of the optimal value. We also show that, in contrast to blind MDPs, finite-
recall strategies do not suffice for ε-approximation in general POMDPs.
• Computational complexity. An important consequence of our above result is that the deci-
sion version of the approximation problem for POMDPs with long-run average objectives
is recursively enumerable (R.E.)-complete. Our results on strategy complexity imply the
recursively enumerable upper bound, by simply enumerating over all finite-memory strate-
gies; and the recursively enumerable lower bound is a consequence of the undecidability
result of [22].
Significance. To clarify the significance of our result, we mention some relationship of parity
objectives (a canonical form for ω-regular objectives) and long-run average objectives.
• First, there is a polynomial-time reduction of parity objectives to mean-reward objectives
in perfect-information games [18], however, no such polynomial-time reduction is known
in the other direction.
• Second, for perfect-information MDPs there is a strongly polynomial-time reduction from
parity objectives to long-run average objectives [10] 2, however, no such strongly polynomial-
time reduction is known in the other direction.
• Third, in terms of topological complexity, parity objectives lie in the Boolean closure of
the second levels of the Borel hierarchy [23, 32], whereas long-run average objectives are
complete for the third level of the Borel hierarchy [8].
Thus in terms of analysis in related models (games and MDPs) and topological complexity, long-
run average objectives are harder than parity objectives. In this light our results are significant
and surprising in the following ways:
• First, there are examples of blind MDPs with parity objectives [3, 1] where there is an
infinite-memory strategy to ensure the objective with probability 1, whereas for every
finite-memory strategy the objective is satisfied with probability 0. Hence, finite-memory
strategies do no guarantee any approximation for POMDPs with parity objectives. In
contrast, we establish that for POMDPs with long-run average objectives finite-memory
strategies suffice for ε-approximation, for all ε > 0.
• Second, for POMDPs with parity objectives, even qualitative problems are Σ02-complete,
whereas we show that for POMDPs with long-run average objectives the approximation
problem is R.E.-complete (or Σ01-complete).
1The belief state-space represents an infinite-state space perfect information MDP where a belief state repre-
sents a probability distribution over states of the POMDP.
2The results of [10] show that the optimal value in perfect-information MDPs with parity objectives is the
optimal value to reach the set of states from where the objective can be satisfied almost-surely, and the almost-
sure set can be computed in strongly polynomial time. Since reachability objectives are special case of long-run
average objectives this establishes a strongly polynomial-time reduction.
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• Finally, for POMDPs with parity objectives, algorithms based on belief-state discretiza-
tion do not guarantee convergence to the value. In contrast our result on existence of
finite-memory strategies for approximation suggest that algorithms based on appropri-
ately chosen belief-state space discretization can ensure convergence to the optimal value
for POMDPs with long-run average objectives.
In summary, though in related models and in terms of topological complexity the long-run
average objectives are harder than parity objectives, quite surprisingly we show that for the
approximation problem in POMDPs, in terms of strategy complexity, computational and algo-
rithmic complexity, long-run average objectives are simpler than parity objectives.
2 Model and statement of results
2.1 Model
For C a finite set, denote ∆(C) the set of probability distributions over C.
Consider a POMDP Γ = (K,A, S, q, g), with finite state space K, finite action set A, finite
signal set S, transition function q : K ×A→ ∆(K ×S), and reward function g : K×A→ [0, 1].
Given p1 ∈ ∆(K) called initial belief, the POMDP starting from p1 is denoted by Γ(p1) and
proceeds as follows:
• An initial state k1 is drawn from p1. The decision-maker knows p1 but does not know k1.
• At each stage m ≥ 1, the decision-maker takes some action am ∈ A. He gets a stage
reward gm := g(km, am), where km is the state at stage m. Then, a pair (km+1, sm) is
drawn from the probability q(km, am): km+1 is the next state, and the decision-maker is
informed of the signal sm, but neither of the reward gm nor of the state km+1.
At stage m, the decision-maker remembers all the past actions and signals before stage m, which
is called history before stage m. Let Hm := (A × S)
m−1 be the set of histories before stage m,
with the convention (A × S)0 = ∅. A strategy is a mapping σ : ∪m≥1Hm → A. The set of
strategies is denoted by Σ. The infinite sequence (k1, a1, s1, k2, a2, s2 . . . ) is called a play. For
p1 ∈ ∆(K) and σ ∈ Σ, define P
p1
σ the law induced by σ and the initial belief p1 on the set of
plays of the game Ω = (K × A × S)N, and Ep1σ the expectation with respect to this law. For
simplicity, denote Pkσ = P
δk
σ , for all k ∈ K, where δk stands for the Dirac measure over state k.
Let
γp1∞(σ) := E
p1
σ
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
gm
)
,
and
v∞(p1) = sup
σ∈Σ
γp1∞(σ) .
The term γp1∞(σ) is the long-term payoff given by strategy σ and v∞(p1) is the optimal long-term
payoff, called value, defined as the supremum payoff over all strategies. For simplicity, denote
γkσ = γ
δk
σ and E
k
σ = E
δk
σ , for every k ∈ K.
Remark 2.1. In literature, the concept of strategy that we defined is often called pure strategy,
by contrast with mixed strategies, that use randomness. By Kuhn’s theorem, enlarging the set
of pure strategies to mixed strategies does not change v∞ (see [33] and [13]), and thus does not
change our results. Moreover, v∞ coincides with the limit of the value of the n-stage problem
and λ-discounted problem, as well as the uniform value and weighted uniform value (see [31, 29,
30, 33]).
Definition 2.2. A POMDP is called blind MDP if the signal set is a singleton.
Thus, in a blind MDP, the decision-maker does not get any relevant signal at any time, and
a strategy is simply an infinite sequence of actions (a1, a2, . . . ) ∈ A
N.
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2.2 Contribution
We start by defining several classes of strategies.
Definition 2.3. Let p1 ∈ ∆(K) and ε > 0. A strategy σ ∈ Σ is ε-optimal in Γ(p1) if it satisfies
γp1∞(σ) ≥ v∞(p1)− ε .
Definition 2.4 (Finite memory strategy). A strategy σ is said to have finite memory if it can
be modeled by a finite-state transducer. Formally, σ = (σu, σa,M,m0), where M is a finite set
of memory states, m0 is the initial memory state, σa : M → A is the action selection function
and σu :M ×A× S →M is the memory update function.
Definition 2.5 (Finite recall strategy). A strategy σ is said to have finite recall if it only needs
the last portion of the history to make decisions. Formally, there exists M > 0 such that for all
m > M,hM ∈ HM , σ(hm−M , hM ) does not depend on hm−M ∈ Hm−M .
Definition 2.6 (Eventually periodic strategy). Assume that Γ is a blind MDP. A strategy
σ = (a1, a2, . . .) is eventually periodic if there exists T ≥ 1 and N ≥ 1 such that for all m ≥ N ,
am+T = am.
Remark 2.7. An eventually periodic strategy has finite recall, and a finite recall strategy has
finite memory. But the inverse is not true: finite memory strategies do not necessarily have
finite recall.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 2.8. For every POMDP Γ, initial belief p1 and ε > 0, there exists an ε-optimal
strategy in Γ(p1) that has finite memory.
In addition, the result for the blind MDP case is stronger:
Theorem 2.9. For every blind MDP Γ, initial belief p1 and ε > 0, there exists an ε-optimal
strategy in Γ(p1) that is eventually periodic, and thus has finite recall.
An important consequence of Theorem 2.8 is R.E.-completeness of the decision version of
the approximation problem as mentioned in Section 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 recalls a result in [33] that plays
an important role in the proof. Section 4 proves Theorem 2.9. The proof is also useful to
understand the main ingredients of the proof of Theorem 2.8, which is presented in Section 5.
3 Beliefs and an ergodic property
The following concept plays a key role in the study of POMDPs and in our paper.
Definition 3.1. Given a strategy σ ∈ Σ and an initial belief p1, the belief at stage m ≥ 1 of the
decision-maker is the random variable pm taking values in ∆(K), such that for all k ∈ K,
pm(k) = P
p1
σ (km = k | hm),
where hm ∈ Hm is the (random) history up to stage m.
Conditional on signal sm, the belief pm is updated at the end of stage m into belief pm+1,
using Bayes rule. To avoid heavy notations, we omit the dependence of pm in σ and p1.
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Remark 3.2. The belief synthesizes all the relevant information available to the player about the
current state. Note that it is not known whether for each ε > 0, there exist ε-optimal strategies
that are belief-stationary: these are strategies such that at each stage m, the action taken depends
on the current belief pm only. Nonetheless, even if this result was known to hold, it would not
be of much help in the proof of Theorem 2.8. Indeed, the set of beliefs is infinite, and computing
pm at each stage may require memory that grows to infinity as m goes to infinity. Thus, a
belief-stationary strategy may not have finite memory.
For p ∈ ∆(K), the support of p, denoted by Supp(p), is the set of k ∈ K such that p(k) > 0.
In [33], it was proven that v∞ is equal to the limit of the n-stage value, as n grows to infinity. In
this paper, we make use of the results in [33, Lemmas 33-34, p. 2004-2005], that are summarized
below:
Lemma 3.3. (Venel and Ziliotto 2016) For any initial belief p1 and ε > 0, there exists m
ε
0 ≥ 1
and σε ∈ Σ and a belief p∗ ∈ ∆(K) (which depends on the history up to stage mε0) such that:
1. There is an event Ω0 ⊂ Ω with P
p1
σε(Ω0) ≥ 1− ε, where∥∥pmε
0
− p∗
∥∥
1
≤ ε ,
2. There exists σ ∈ Σ such that for all k ∈ Supp(p∗)
1
n
n∑
m=1
gm → γ
k
∞(σ) P
k
σ − a.s. (1)
Moreover, γp
∗
∞(σ) = v∞(p
∗) and Ep1σε(v∞(p
∗)) ≥ v∞(p1)− ε.
Remark 3.4. Note that Pkσ represents the law on plays induced by the strategy σ, conditional on
the fact that the initial state is k. This does not mean that we consider that the decision-maker
knows k. In the same fashion, γk∞(σ) is the reward given by the strategy σ, conditional on the
fact that the initial state is k. Even though σ is 0-optimal in Γ(p∗), this does not imply that σ
is 0-optimal in Γ(δk): we may have γ
k
∞(σ) < v∞(δk).
Another important point of this result is that all the average payoffs converge almost surely to a
limit that only depends on the initial state k. This is a key ingredient in the proof of Theorems
2.8 and 2.9.
Intuitively, this result means that for any initial belief p1, after a finite number of stages, we
can get ε-close to a belief p∗ such that the optimal payoff from p∗ is in expectation almost the
same as from p1, and moreover from p
∗ there exists a 0-optimal strategy that induces a strong
ergodic behavior on the state dynamics. Thus, there is a natural way to build a 3ε-optimal
strategy in Γ(p1): first, apply the strategy σ
ε for mε0 stages, then apply σ. Since after m
ε
0
steps the current belief pmε0 is ε-close to p
∗ with probability higher than 1− ε, the reward from
playing σ is at least the expectation of γp
∗
∞(σ)−2ε, which is higher than v∞(p1)−3ε. Thus, this
procedure yields a 3ε-optimal strategy. Nonetheless, σ may not have finite memory, and thus
this strategy may not have either.
The idea of the proofs in both Theorems 2.8 and 2.9 is to turn σ into a finite memory
strategy, making use of the ergodic property in Lemma 3.3. We first consider the case of blind
MDPs, as it introduces all key ideas needed to prove Theorem 2.8.
4 Blind MDPs
As described in Section 2.1, a blind MDP is a POMDP where there is only one possible signal,
this way the decision-maker gets no information about the state, at any stage. In this section,
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we assume that Γ is a blind MDP. In this framework, the transition can be viewed as a function
q : K × A → ∆(K), and a strategy is simply an infinite sequence of actions: Σ = AN. Fix an
initial belief p1 ∈ ∆(K).
An important feature of this model is that, for every strategy, the belief process (pm) is de-
terministic. Consequently, Lemma 3.3 simplifies as follows:
Lemma 4.1. There exists a (deterministic) belief p∗ ∈ ∆(K) such that:
1. p∗ can be (approximately) reached from p1: for all ε > 0, there exists σ
ε and mε0 ≥ 1 such
that under σε,
∥∥pmε0 − p∗∥∥1 ≤ ε
2. There exists σ ∈ Σ such that for all k ∈ Supp(p∗)
1
n
n∑
m=1
gm → γ
k
∞(σ) P
k
σ − a.s., (2)
and γp
∗
∞(σ) = v∞(p
∗) = v∞(p1).
From now on, ε > 0 is fixed, and let p∗, mε0, σ
ε and σ = (a1, a2, . . . ) be like in Lemma 4.1.
We are going to prove that in the problem starting from p∗, there exists an eventually periodic ε-
optimal strategy σ′. As we shall see, this property easily implies Theorem 2.9: indeed, playing σε
until stage mε0, and then switching to σ
′ constitutes an eventually periodic 2ε-optimal strategy.
The following concept plays a key role in the proof.
Definition 4.2. The m-shift of σ is the strategy σm = (am, am+1, ...).
Define an equivalence relation over Supp(p∗) as follows: k ∼ k′ if and only if γk∞(σ) = γ
k′
∞(σ),
and let K1, . . . ,Kr ⊆ K, r ≥ 1 be the associated partition: Supp(p
∗) = K1 ⊔K2...⊔Kr. Denote
γi∞ for γ
k
∞(σ), k ∈ Ki.
Definition 4.3. The super-support at stage m is the r-tuple (B1m, B
2
m, . . . , B
r
m), where for each
i ∈ [|1, r|], Bim ⊂ K is the set of states that are reached with positive probability at stage m under
σ, starting from an initial state in Ki. Formally, B
i
m = ∪k∈KiSupp(P
k
σ(km = ·)).
Given a very large integer n0 and starting from p
∗, we are going to build an ε-optimal
strategy such that the sequence of actions played between stages sn0+1 and (s+1)n0 depends
on Bsn0+1 only. Since the set of possible super-support is finite and the evolution of super-
supports in time is deterministic, this type of strategy is eventually periodic. For this we prove
the following crucial property of super-support which shows that from any initial state lying in
Bim, the strategy σ
m yields the same reward as the strategy σ starting from an initial state in
Ki.
Lemma 4.4. For all m ≥ 1, i ∈ [|1, r|] and k ∈ Bim,
γk∞(σ
m) = γi∞ .
Consequently, B1m, . . . , B
r
m are disjoint.
Proof. Let m ≥ 1 and k ∈ Bim. There exists k
′ ∈ Ki such that k is reached with positive
probability from k′: Pk
′
σ (km = k) > 0. By Lemma 4.1, we have
1
n
m+n−1∑
m′=m
gm′ → γ
k′
∞(σ) = γ
i
∞ P
k′
σ − a.s.,
6
thus in particular
1
n
n∑
m′=1
gm′ → γ
i
∞ P
k
σm − a.s.,
and γk∞(σ
m) = γi∞.
Consequently, if k ∈ Bim ∩B
i′
m, then γ
k
∞(σ
m) = γi∞ = γ
i′
∞, thus i = i
′.
The set ∪m≥1 {Bm} is a finite set, thus it can be written ∪m≥1 {Bm} = {Bm1 , Bm2 , ..., Bmt},
where 1 = m1 < ... < mt and each partition is different.
Definition of the strategy σ′. Let ε > 0. By Lemma 4.4, there exists n0 ∈ N
∗ such that for
all i ∈ [|1, r|], j ∈ [|1, t|] and k ∈ Bimj ,
E
k
σ
mj
(
1
n0
n0∑
m=1
gm
)
≥ γi∞ − ε.
Define recursively a sequence (js)s≥0 by: j0 = 0 and js is such that Bmjs−1+n0 = Bmjs .
Define the strategy σ′ by: for all s ≥ 0, play the sequence of actions (amjs , amjs+1, ...amjs+n0−1)
between stages sn0 + 1 and (s + 1)n0. In words, during each time block [|sn0 + 1, (s + 1)n0|],
the decision-maker plays as if he was playing σ from stage mjs .
For sake of notation, denote Bjs = Bmjs and σ
js = σmjs . The following lemma states the
properties of this collection of partitions.
Lemma 4.5. For all m ≥ 1, i ∈ [|1, r|] and s ≥ 0 we have that Pp
∗
σ′ -almost surely
ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js if and only if k1 ∈ Ki .
Consequently, Bjs = (B
1
js
, . . . , Brjs) is a partition of P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 = ·), and
P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
) = p∗(Ki).
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, B1js , . . . , B
r
js
are disjoint. Let us prove the result by induction on s ≥ 0.
For s = 0, Bj0 = (K1, . . . ,Kr) and P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 = ·) = p
∗(·), thus the result holds. Assume
s ≥ 1. Starting from k ∈ Bijs−1 and playing σ
js−1 during n0 stages leads the state to be in
Bijs−1+n0 = B
i
js
. Consequently, if k(s−1)n0+1 ∈ B
i
js−1
, then ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
.
Conversely, assume ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
. By induction hypothesis, k(s−1)n0+1 lies in B
i′
js−1
for some
i′. By what precedes, ksn0+1 ∈ B
i′
js
, and thus by Lemma 4.4, i = i′.
To summarize, we have proved that ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
if and only if k(s−1)n0+1 ∈ B
i
js−1
. By
induction hypothesis, we deduce that ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
if and only if k1 ∈ K1.
To finish the proof of Theorem 2.9, the idea is that if at stage m the state is k ∈ Bim, and σ
m
is played, this induces an expected average reward of approximately γi∞ in this block. The key
point is that this is true for any k ∈ Bim. Thus, if the belief at stagem is pm, the expected average
reward in this block is approximately
∑r
i=1 pm(B
i
m)γ
i
∞ =
∑r
i=1 p
∗(Ki)γ
i
∞ = v∞(p
∗) = v∞(p1),
and thus summing the reward on all the blocks yield approximately v∞(p1). In the former
inequality, we have used the fundamental property stated in the previous lemma: under strategy
σ′, the weight on Bim is independent of m.
The above informal argument is the intuition behind the following lemma, and the proof is
relegated to the appendix:
Lemma 4.6.
E
p∗
σ′
(
1
Sn0
Sn0∑
m=1
gm
)
≥ v∞(p1)− ε.
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Proof of Theorem 2.9. Since the strategy σ′ is eventually periodic, the average rewards converge
almost surely. Thus, the above lemma yields
γp
∗
∞(σ
′) = Ep
∗
σ′
(
lim
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
gm
)
≥ v∞(p1)− ε.
Define the strategy σ0 as follows: play σε until stage mε0, then switch to σ
′. Note that σ0 is
eventually periodic. We have
γp1∞(σ
0) = γ
pmε
0
∞ (σ
′)
≥ γp
∗
∞(σ
′)− ε
≥ v∞(p1)− 2ε,
where the first inequality stems from Lemma 4.1, and the theorem is proved.
Remark 4.7. The finite memory strategy we built mainly relies on the computation of the
super-support. We would like to emphasize that it is crucial to consider super-support, and that
keeping track of the support is not enough, as shown in the following example.
Example 4.8. Consider two states, k1 and k2, two actions, a and b, and initial belief (1/4) ·
δk1 + (3/4) · δk2 . Regardless of the actions played, the state goes from k1 to k2 with probability
1, and k2 to k1 with probability 1. The action a is good in state k1 (reward 1) and bad in state
k2 (reward 0), and action b is good in state k2 (reward 1) and bad in state k1 (reward 0).
A strategy that only depends on the support of the belief plays either a always, or b always,
and thus achieves a long-term payoff of 1/2. By contrast, if at each stage m, the decision-maker
knows not only the support of the belief, but knows whether the weight on state k1 comes from
state k1 or k2, then he knows whether the weight of the belief on k1 is 1/4 or 3/4, and can play
b in the first case and a in the second case, securing a long-term payoff of 3/4.
5 POMDPs
In this setting, the decision-maker is given a signal after each action which is related to the
current state of the system. Thus, strategies can depend on past actions and received signals.
We refer to Section 2.1 for the formal definition of a POMDP.
In comparison with the blind MDP case, the belief process is now random, since it depends on
the signals obtained. In other words, the same sequence of actions may lead us to a different
beliefs by receiving different signals. Therefore, the concepts introduced before of m-shift and
super-support need to depend on history instead of time. Making this slight adjustment, the
proof follows naturally. The finite recall property is lost in this proof by the fact that whenever
we have to “restart” the strategy, we still need to know how we got there in the first place.
Therefore, instead of remembering the last steps in history, one needs the first steps to keep
track of the correct actions. This is explained further in Remark 5.6.
Fix an initial belief p1 ∈ ∆(K) and ε > 0, and consider m
ε
0, σ
ε, Ω0, p
∗ and σ as defined in
Lemma 3.3. By Lemma 3.3, it is enough to prove that there exists a finite-memory ε-optimal
strategy starting from p∗.
The counterpart of m-shift and super-support are formally defined as follows.
Definition 5.1. For hm ∈ Hm, the hm-shift of σ is the strategy σ[hm] defined as follows: for
all m′ ≥ 1, σ[hm](hm′) := σ(hm, hm′).
Define an equivalence relation over Supp(p∗) as follows: k ∼ k′ if and only if γk∞(σ) = γ
k′
∞(σ),
and let K1, ...Kr ⊂ K, r ≥ 1 be the associated partition: Supp(p
∗) = K1 ⊔K2... ⊔Kr. Denote
γi∞ for γ
k
∞(σ), k ∈ Ki.
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Definition 5.2. The super-support after history hm is the r-uple (B
1[hm], B
2[hm], . . . , B
r[hm]),
where for each i ∈ [|1, r|], Bi[hm] ⊆ K is the set of states that are reached with positive
probability after history hm, under σ and starting from an initial state in Ki. Formally,
Bi[hm] = ∪k∈KiSupp(P
k
σ(km = ·|hm)).
Informally, replacing this notation in Section 4 leads to the desired result: both sections
have the same structures and proof were made as similar as possible for sake of understanding.
Nonetheless, there are some more technicalities in the POMDP case that must be addressed.
Given a very large integer n0 and starting from p
∗, we are going to build an ε-optimal
strategy such that the actions taken between stages sn0 + 1 and (s + 1)n0 depends only on
the signals received after stage sn0 + 1 and of B[hsn0+1]. Since the set of possible super-
supports is finite, this type of strategy requires only finite memory. For p ∈ ∆(K), define
Hpm := {hm ∈ Hm : P
p
σ(hm) > 0}.
Lemma 5.3. For all m ≥ 1, hm ∈ H
p∗
m , i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and for all k ∈ Bi[hm],
γk∞(σ[hm]) = γ
i
∞ .
Proof. Let k ∈ Bi[hm]. There exists k
′ ∈ Ki such that k is reached with positive probability
from k′: Pk
′
σ (km = k) > 0. We have
1
n
m+n−1∑
m′=m
gm′ → γ
k′
∞(σ) = γ
i
∞ P
k′
σ − a.s.,
thus in particular it holds for all possible evolutions of hm. Then,
1
n
n∑
m′=1
gm′ → γ
i
∞ P
k
σ[hm]
− a.s.,
and γk∞(σ[hm]) = γ
i
∞.
The set ∪
m≥1,hm∈H
p∗
m
{B[hm]} is a finite set, thus it can be written as
{
B[h1], B[h2], . . . , B[ht]
}
,
where the B[hj ] are distinct.
Definition of the strategy σ′. Let ε > 0. By Lemma 5.3, there exists n0 ∈ N
∗ such that for
all i ∈ [|1, r|], j ∈ [|1, t|] and k ∈ Bi[hj ],
E
k
σ[hj ]
(
1
n0
n0∑
m=1
gm
)
≥ γi∞(σ)− ε .
Define the strategy σ′ by induction such that for all s ≥ 0, for all sn0 + 1 ≤ m ≤ (s+ 1)n0,
σ′ plays only according to the history between stage sn0 + 1 and m, and on a variable js that
is updated at each stage sn0 + 1 according to history.
Set j0 := 1. Let s ≥ 0 and h ∈ (A × S)
m−sn0−1. Let σ′(js, h) := σ(h
js , h), and update js in
the following way: define js+1 such that B[h
js , h′] = B[hjs+1 ], where h′ is the history between
stages sn0 + 1 and (s + 1)n0. Note that js takes always values in [|1, t|].
In words, during each time block [|sn0 + 1, (s + 1)n0|], the decision-maker plays as if he was
playing σ from history hjs .
For sake of notation, denote Bjs = B[h
js ] and σjs = σ[hjs ].
Now we can state another property of the super-support.
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Lemma 5.4. For all m ≥ 1, hm ∈ H
p∗
m , i ∈ [|1, r|] and s ≥ 0 we have that P
p∗
σ′ -almost surely
ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
if and only if k1 ∈ Ki .
Consequently, Bjs = (B
1
js
, . . . , Brjs) is a partition of P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 = ·), and
P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js) = p
∗(Ki) .
Proof. By Lemma 5.3, the (Bijs) are disjoint. Let us prove by induction that they form a partition
of Pp
∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 = ·). For s = 0, Bj0 = (K1, . . . ,Kr) and P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 = ·) = p
∗(·), thus the result
holds. Assume s ≥ 1. Starting from k ∈ Bijs−1 = B
i[hjs−1 ], playing σjs−1 during n0 stages and
collecting history h (the history between stages (s − 1)n0 + 1 and sn0 + 1), lead the state to
be in Bi[(hjs−1 , h)] = Bi[hjs ], by definition of the index js. Consequently, if k(s−1)n0+1 ∈ B
i
js−1
,
then ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
.
Conversely, assume ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
. By induction hypothesis, k(s−1)n0+1 lies in B
i′
js−1
for some
i′. By what precedes, ksn0+1 ∈ B
i′
js
, and thus by Lemma 5.3, i = i′.
To summarize, we have proved that ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
if and only if k(s−1)n0+1 ∈ B
i
js−1
. By
induction hypothesis, we deduce that ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
if and only if k1 ∈ Ki.
To finish the proof, the idea is that at stage m the state is k ∈ Bim, and σ
m is played, this
induces an expected average reward of approximately γi∞ in this block. Thus, if the belief at
stage m is pm, the expected average reward in this block is approximately
∑r
i=1 pm(B
i
m)γ
i
∞ =∑r
i=1 p
∗(Ki)γ
i
∞ = γ
p∗
∞(σ), and thus summing the reward on all the blocks yield approximately
γp
∗
∞(σ). This is the intuition behind the following lemma, which proof is relegated to the ap-
pendix:
Lemma 5.5.
E
p∗
σ′
(
1
Sn0
Sn0∑
m=1
gm
)
≥ γp
∗
∞(σ)− ε.
Proof Theorem 2.8. Since the strategy σ′ has finite memory, the average rewards converge almost
surely. It follows from Lemma 5.5 that
γp
∗
∞(σ
′) = Ep
∗
σ′
(
lim
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
gm
)
≥ γp
∗
∞(σ)− ε.
Define the strategy σ0 as follows: play σε until stage mε0, then switch to σ
′. Note that σ0
has finite memory. We have
γp1∞(σ
0) = Ep1σε
(
γ
pmε
0
∞ (σ
′)
)
≥ Ep1σε
(
γp
∗
∞(σ
′)
)
− ε
≥ Ep1σε
(
γp
∗
∞(σ)
)
− 2ε
≥ v∞(p1)− 3ε,
and the theorem is proved.
Remark 5.6. Finite recall is not enough to obtain ε-optimality in the general POMDP case, as
shown in the example below.
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Example 5.7. The idea described in this example is that one needs to know how one got to the
current situation to decide what actions to take, and it is not enough to know the last steps.
This POMDP Γ = (K,A, S, q, g) has five states: an initial state from where a random initial
signal is given, a dump state from where it is impossible to get out and reward is zero and two
sub-systems where the optimal strategy is trivial. The key idea is that there is an arbitrarily long
sequence of actions and signals which can be gotten in both systems, but the optimal strategies
behaves differently in each of them, therefore, to forget the initial signal of the POMDP leads to
at most half of the optimal value.
The following is a representation of Γ: first under action a and then action b. Each state is
followed by the corresponding reward, and the arrows include the probability for the corresponding
transition along with the signal obtained. In this case, each transition allows only one signal.
k0|0
k1|1 k2|0
k3|1
k4|0
1/2; sb
1/2; sb
1; sa
1/2; sa
1/2; sa
1/2; sa
1/2; sb
1; sa
k0|0
k1|1 k2|0
k3|1
k4|0
1/2; sb
1; sa
1; sa
1/2; sa
1; sa
1; sa
The value of the game starting from k0 is 5/6. In the other hand, the maximum value
obtained by strategies with finite recall is only 1/2, by playing, for example, always action a.
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Appendix
5.1 Proof of Lemma 4.6
E
p∗
σ′

 1
n0
(s+1)n0∑
m=sn0+1
gm

 = Ep∗σ′
(
E
ksn0+1
σjs
(
1
n0
n0∑
m=1
gm
))
def. σ′
= Ep
∗
σ′

 r∑
i=1
∑
k∈Bijs
1ksn0+1=k
E
k
σjs
(
1
n0
n0∑
m=1
gm
) Lemma 4.5
≥ Ep
∗
σ′

 r∑
i=1
∑
k∈Bijs
1ksn0+1=k
[
γi∞(σ)− ε
] def. n0
=
(
r∑
i=1
P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js
)
[
γi∞(σ)− ε
])
=
r∑
i=1
p∗(Ki)
[
γi∞(σ)− ε
]
Lemma 4.5
= γp
∗
∞(σ)− ε .
We can now prove that γp
∗
∞(σ′) ≥ v∞(p1)− ε. Indeed, we have
E
p∗
σ′
(
1
Sn0
Sn0∑
m=1
gm
)
=
1
S
S−1∑
s=0
E
p∗
σ′

 1
n0
(s+1)n0∑
m=sn0+1
gm


≥ γp
∗
∞(σ)− ε
= v∞(p1)− ε .
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5.2 Proof of Lemma 5.5
E
p∗
σ′

 1
n0
(s+1)n0∑
m=sn0+1
gm

 = Ep∗σ′
(
E
ksn0+1
σjs
(
1
n0
n0∑
m=1
gm
))
def. σ′
= Ep
∗
σ′

 r∑
i=1
∑
k∈Bijs
1ksn0+1=k
E
k
σjs
(
1
n0
n0∑
m=1
gm
) Lemma 5.4
≥ Ep
∗
σ′

 r∑
i=1
∑
k∈Bijs
1ksn0+1=k
[
γi∞(σ)− ε
]

 def. n0
=
(
r∑
i=1
P
p∗
σ′ (ksn0+1 ∈ B
i
js)
[
γi∞(σ)− ε
])
=
r∑
i=1
p∗(Ki)
[
γi∞(σ)− ε
]
Lemma 5.4
= γp
∗
∞(σ)− ε .
It follows that
E
p∗
σ′
(
1
Sn0
Sn0∑
m=1
gm
)
=
1
S
S−1∑
s=0
E
p∗
σ′

 1
n0
(s+1)n0∑
m=sn0+1
gm


≥ γp
∗
∞(σ)− ε.
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